Nicolaus Cusanus Unbound: An Investigation into Parallels between his Liberal Philosophy and Object-Oriented Ontology by Mikado, Naruhiko
THESIS - Vol. 8, No. 1, Spring 2019
International Research Journal
Nicolaus Cusanus Unbound: An Investigation 
into Parallels between his Liberal Philosophy 
and Object-Oriented Ontology 
Naruhiko Mikado
How to cite this article:  
Mikado, N. (2019). Nicolaus Cusanus Unbound: An Investigation into Parallels between his 
Liberal Philosophy and Object-Oriented Ontology. Thesis. Vol. 8. Iss. 1. Pristina: 
AAB College. (51-67).  
Published online: June 8, 2019 
Article received on the 24th of April, 2019. 
Article accepted on the 28th of May, 2019. 
Conict of Interest: The author declares no conict of interests.
ISSN: 1848-4298 (Print) ISSN: 2623-8381(Online)
/2018
Volume 8 
Number 1
Spring 2019
pISSN 1848-4298
oISSN 2623-8381
Original Article 
Thesis, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2019     51 
Nicolaus Cusanus Unbound: An Investigation 
into Parallels between his Liberal Philosophy 
and Object-Oriented Ontology 
 
Naruhiko Mikado 
Osaka University, Osaka, Japan 
Email: naruhiko.mikado.19921027@gmail.com 
 
Abstract 
This paper intends to reexamine the idiosyncratic thoughts of 
Nicholaus Cusanus (Nicholas of Cusa), a fifteenth-century 
German theologian-cum-philosopher who has generally been 
considered to be just a transitional figure to the succeeding, 
modern thinkers. The chief argument of this essay is that his 
conception of God as both immanent and transcendent has a 
number of interesting parallels with contemporary, de-
anthropocentric philosophies, especially with Graham 
Harman‘s object-oriented ontology (OOO), and in fact can be 
regarded as a prescient harbinger to OOO in that Nicholas 
evidently urges one to assume a more liberal worldview while 
simultaneously equipping his own theory with a logic 
intelligible to others. In the closing section, the author of this 
paper poses a few proposals drawn from the investigation both 
to the discipline of philosophy and to the general public. 
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In so far as one can discern from various accounts in 
existing publications, it appears to be a general consensus 
amongst most scholars to adjudicate Nolaus Cusanus (Nicholas 
of Cusa) either to be a transitional thinker between the high 
Renaissance and the early modern period, or to be a harbinger 
to the latter. For instance, McTighe (1964) judged his conception 
of ‗coincidence of opposites‘ to be a forerunner of modern, 
rational ways of thinking, because with it Nicholas tried to 
prove the existence of God with the aid of mathematical 
rationale, that is, with a scientific method, while Miller (2017) 
regards that pantheistic orientation which can be widely seen in 
his texts as the precursor to the philosophy of Spinoza (pp. 153-
154). True it is that these evaluations are legitimate to a 
respectable extent, and it is not only pointless but also 
counterproductive to poke holes in them. 
Nevertheless, it would remiss of us to demote the varied 
qualities of the ideas which he propounded just to the role of a 
mere herald of succeeding philosophies. There is no doubt that 
he retained a touch of the medieval theology in that he 
principally discussed problems relative to the God; still, when 
one observes them from a little detached standpoint, she or he 
will locate a lot of traits which bear a curious resemblance with 
several philosophical thoughts of our age. 
Above all else, it is remarkable that the philosophy of 
Nicholas of Cusa evinces ‗object-oriented‘ characters; concretely 
speaking, in his texts we can identify a horizontal perspective 
which regards every one of existences as ontologically equal, as 
well as a fastidious argumentation which guarantees the 
independence of each of those beings. As is well known these 
days, object-oriented ontology (OOO) is a school of philosophy 
that has been advocated by a number of theorists like Graham 
Harman, Levi Bryant, and Timothy Morton, and the influence 
of OOO is rapidly spreading especially in art and architecture 
(Kolatan, 2019, p. 91). Although OOO is a product of this era, it 
shares peculiar characteristics with the thoughts of Nicholas of 
Cusa, and it seems that to heed this aspect would be conducive 
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to some interesting discoveries which have potential to make 
our worldview more broad-minded. 
In order to demonstrate the analogies between them, the 
argument of this essay will go as follows: in the beginning, 
OOO itself and two of its essential components—flat ontology 
and withdrawal—are going to be explained by quoting 
passages from Harman‘s texts. Thereupon, the parallels 
between these principles of OOO and the progressive 
metaphysics of Nicholas of Cusa will be investigated, and then 
the next section will demonstrate that the philosopher of the 
15th century possessed an astoundingly de-anthropocentric 
intention, positing that God as the absolute maximum inheres 
in every single one of entities and that all of them are unable to 
be reduced or exhausted by another. In closing, this essay will 
put forward several proposals both to the discipline of 
philosophy including a reappraisal of underestimated thinkers 
like Nicholas of Cusa and to the general public. 
 
Object-Oriented Ontology, Flat Ontology, and 
Withdrawal 
 
One notable tendency in the field of philosophy during the last 
couple of decades is that our species, scilicet mankind, has been 
gradually deprived of its exceptional status among other forms 
of beings; one could modify it with such adjectives as ‗post-
human‘ and ‗de-anthropocentric‘. Richard Grusin (2014), who 
has been active in multiple spheres of scholarship, gave a lucid 
exposition of this trend with the term of ‗nonhuman turn‘: 
 
Intended as a macroscopic concept, the nonhuman turn is 
meant to account for the simultaneous or overlapping 
emergence of a number of different theoretical or critical 
‗turns‘—for example, the ontological, network, neurological, 
affective, digital, ecological, or evolutionary…. Each of these 
different elements of the nonhuman turn derives from 
theoretical movements that argue (in one way or another) 
against human exceptionalism…. (pp. ix-x) 
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Needless to say, despite having a shared aim to challenge 
the naïve human centrism which had long gone unquestioned, 
each of those movements pursues its own distinctive agenda: 
For example, some theorists have placed a major emphasis 
upon animals, mammals in especial, rather than existences in 
general (Hallaway, 2013; MacCormack, 2014), whereas other 
figures like Iain Hamilton Grant (2006) has criticized such a 
leaning as ―biocentrism‖ and claimed that we should also take 
note of inanimate matters. 
One can rightly hold object-oriented ontology as one 
ramification of this tide and may have a snag in discriminating 
it from other critical approaches; yet, it signalizes itself amidst 
them with its categorical determination to treat every object as 
ontologically tantamount and with its meticulously constructed 
framework that substantiates the apparently quixotic 
aspiration. Although one could spot an upholder of OOO in 
diverse academic domains, the person who has made the most 
outstanding contribution to the theoretical refinement of the 
ontology is Graham Harman; now a distinguished professor of 
Southern California Institute of Architecture, he has 
energetically written scores of papers and books about OOO. 
He has stated that the starting point of his philosophy is 
the concept of ‗flat ontology‘, and what corroborates it 
theoretically is the notion of ‗withdrawal‘. The section below 
will elucidate these notions in order to clarify how OOO is 
unique and why the worldview which it is presenting should 
be attended to. 
 
Flat Ontology 
 
‗Flat ontology‘ is a term which was originally set forth by the 
English philosopher of science Roy Bhaskar to collectively 
designate ―theories that flatten the world into its accessibility to 
human observers‖, and ―it was a dismissive phrase aimed at 
positivism‖ (Harman, 2011, p. 177). But the meaning of the 
expression was later transformed by Manuel DeLanda into a 
positive one; now the foremost sense of the phrase is an 
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ontology that first and foremost deals with all objects in the 
same way (Harman, 2018). Although he has repeatedly made 
clear that he intends to furnish his object-oriented ontology 
with a more sophisticated, persuasive structure, he has 
reckoned flat ontology as a suitable starting point for 
philosophy and as a useful way to ensure that we do not cave 
in to our personal biases about what is or is not real (Harman, 
2018). 
The concept of flat ontology might strike one as too 
simple and plain, and some would wonder the reason why 
Harman puts such a particular stress upon it as the ground zero 
of his ontology. In fact, this is exactly because he wants to bring 
the usually disregarded fact to light that most philosophies 
from antiquity to this day have not accorded condign 
consideration to each of the different, discrete objects and in 
lieu reduced them either downward to their material 
foundations or upward to their functional aspects (Harman, 
2011a). Albeit a bit abstract, this penetrative assertion is of 
considerable intellectual significance since it reveals the central 
problem with which many of the modern philosophical schools 
are beset: namely, the predilection for prioritizing relationships 
between/among objects to the substantive objects themselves. 
One could adduce Plato‘s philosophy, German idealism, 
theories advanced by structuralists and post-structuralists, 
‗philosophy of organism‘ of Alfred North Whitehead, and 
‗actor network theory‘ of Bruno Latour. 
Harman (1999) censured these theses by remarking that 
―the paradigm of ‗contextuality‘ or ‗relationality‘ has now been 
stamped in our minds to the point that it dominates every 
corner of our thinking‖ (p. 174), and highlighted the importance 
of reconsidering the independence and autonomy of individual 
objects: ―once we begin from naïvete rather than doubt, objects 
immediately take center stage‖ (Harman, 2011b, p. 7). Being 
keenly aware of this situation and realizing how problematic it 
is, Harman has put forward flat ontology as the base of his 
object-oriented ontology. 
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Withdrawal 
 
However evident the ethical cogency of flat ontology may be, it 
is sure that most people would not rate solely advocating the 
equality of beings as a convincing metaphysics. Harman has 
been naturally cognizant of that, observing that a OOO thinker 
were to say nothing more than ‗humans, animals, inanimate 
matter and fictional characters all equally exist‘ after many 
years of theorization, then not much progression would have 
been made (Harman, 2018). ‗Withdrawal‘ is the conception that 
Harman has employed and polished up in order to turn the 
loose idea of flat ontology into his rigorous, object-oriented 
ontology. 
Although Harman derived a profound inspiration for it 
from the famous ‗tool-analysis‘ which Martin Heidegger had 
conducted in Time and Being, he has evolved it into a more 
comprehensive intellectual conception. The key points of the 
‗tool-analysis‘ are as follows: when a person uses a tool, she or 
he is normally never conscious of its presence; in other words, 
she or he reduces the tool to only an instrumental quality, 
forgetting that it can probably work in a variety of different 
ways; still, it can break, and then she or he is confronted with 
the fact that the tool possesses aspects which have been beyond 
her or his comprehension—in that manner, the tool withdraws 
from its user (Heidegger, 1927/1962, pp. 73-77). Whereas 
Heidegger, possibly constrained by the anthropocentric bent of 
his time, had presumed that withdrawal could occur only 
between a human subject and an object, Harman has posited 
that it could occasion in every contact between objects: 
 
Just as we never grasp the being of the two pieces of rock, 
neither do they fully unlock the being of each other when they 
slam together in distant space. Contra Heidegger, withdrawal is 
not a specific feature of human temporality, but belongs to any 
relation whatsoever. That tool-beings retreat into a silent 
background means not only that they are invisible to humans, 
but that they exceed any of their interactions with other tool 
beings. (Harman, 1999, 5; italics original) 
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Harman proffered the most thorough discussion 
regarding ‗withdrawal‘ in a chapter of his first book Tool-Being: 
Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects (1999, pp. 101-205), and 
has introduced a good deal of examples to prove the validity of 
the concept elsewhere (2005, pp. 190-230; 2011c, p. 177; 2012, 
pp. 251-260). 
Here one would perceive how cogently this theoretical 
device could equip flat ontology with a logical foundation. 
Allowing for the fact that every single one of existences always 
retains some dormant qualities that might be unknown to 
others and perhaps to itself—what Harman has called 
―unexhausted surplus‖ (2011d, p. 174)—it would be an 
improbable fantasy and sheer hubris for one to assume herself 
or himself to have perfect comprehension of another being. 
Such a realization would prompt one to embrace a schema 
characterized by flat ontological thoughts. Object-oriented 
ontology is, in short, a systematic type of flat ontology which is 
logically upheld by the coherent conception of ‗withdrawal‘. 
One is able to know the primacy of ‗withdrawal‘ in OOO from 
the fact that other ideas that Harman invented to construct his 
ontology (e.g. ‗vicarious causation‘, ‗allure‘, etc.) are all based 
on it. 
 
*** 
 
As could be understood even from the abridged account 
above, OOO has tremendous resonance in this age when the 
cumulative (and often pernicious) effects of our anthropocentric 
activities upon other existences are becoming more and more 
palpable in the various districts of the world. Therefore, 
although those who first come across the bold doctrines of 
OOO may consider them to have been born out of the needs of 
the present day, yet, when one looks into the past history of 
philosophy, she or he will detect several thinkers who 
presciently voiced opinions analogous to OOO: Aristotle and 
Leibnitz are, as Harman (2013) himself pointed out, noteworthy 
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in that they partially accentuated the equal autonomy of each 
being. But the man whom Harman has failed to descry as one of 
his forerunners and who articulated probably the most object-
oriented opinion before him is Nicholas of Cusa. 
 
Object-Oriented Characters of Nicholas of Cusa 
 
As adumbrated in the introductory part, Nicholas of Cusa 
seems to be understood as follows by and large: A Renaissance 
theologian, the principal worth of whose ideas consists in that 
they jointly functioned as one of the springboards for modern, 
more rational thoughts and philosophies (Taton, 1964, p. 13; 
Scribner and Johnson, 1996, p. 244). 
This and other reductive types of comprehension of him, 
however, should be amended since they fail to recognize many 
interesting facets which his texts bring forward. This essay 
would like to throw one of them into relief, namely, its object-
oriented quality. One could locate the most conspicuous 
manifestation of it in his idiosyncratic conceptualization of God. 
He radically opined that God was immanent, which means that 
every entity is the embodiment of God; it inevitably entails that 
all objects are set on a flat plane; meanwhile, he tactfully held 
the view that God was transcendent, therefore each of them was 
not exhaustible by another in that God the Maximum could not 
be fully attained by anything else. This section will describe the 
strategic definition and illuminate how close it is to OOO in 
terms of their de-anthropocentric, object-oriented nature. 
 
God as both Immanent and Transcendent 
 
When one would like to appreciate the unique significance of 
the ideas that Nicholas of Cusa set forth, she or he would be 
recommended to possess an elementary knowledge of the 
predominant view on the relationship between God and other 
beings (both animate and inanimate) which most people had 
assumed to be true during the middle ages. To put it 
schematically, it had been almost universally embraced that the 
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supreme property of God was being transcendent, that is, God 
was conceived as the absolute, perfect creator and originator 
from which all of the other existences were born, and thus 
literally superior to everything else (Bréhier, 1969, pp. 148-149; 
Grant, 2001, p. 287); in other words, people at that time had 
presupposed that ―God is above the world‖ (Schneider, 1931, p. 
626; Muessig, 2006, p. 60). Harman (2018b), as a matter of 
course, has repudiated such an image of God as irrationally 
privileged exception, and this is also the very conception of 
God against which Nicholas of Cusa flung down the gauntlet; 
he, in lieu of the mainstream presumption, proposed a 
perspective on God and other existences that was singularly 
similar to the Harman‘s object-oriented ontology. 
His ontological framework was rooted in the firm belief 
that God was, albeit assuredly transcendent, immanent at the 
same time, which means that God exists in all beings all over 
the universe. Although he was not the first figure who put 
forward such an understanding of God (Simmons, 2015, p. 153), 
he should be noted since he was probably the most strenuous 
advocate of the attitude in his day, to the extent that several 
coeval churchmen suspected that his view had gone too far 
from the official credo and even discussed whether he should 
be arraigned (Hopkins, 1986, p. 8; Gilson, 2019, p. 803). As early 
as the Christmas of 1439, he pronounced this stance in a lecture 
wherein he preached that God should dwell in the soul of every 
being (Hoffman and Klibansky, 1929), and later developed it in 
elaborate detail both in the first and chiefly in the second 
volumes of his signature work which was titled On Learned 
Ignorance. He posited that the world was the enfoldment and 
unfoldment (explicatio in Latin, the original language) of God; 
since every entity in the world exists thanks to God, is born out 
of God, and is in God, the world is both one entirety and is 
made of numerous entireties (Nicholas of Cusa, 1440/2001 pp. 
32-39). It follows that ―there is neither anything which is other 
nor anything which is different, where a man does not differ 
from a lion, and the sky does not differ from the earth‖ 
(Nicholas of Cusa, 1440/2001, p. 41). 
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One could apprehend how radical this proclamation of 
Nicholas of Cusa would have sounded to the ear of his 
contemporaries by simply remembering that those who 
believed in the Roman Catholic Church during the medieval 
period took the naively discriminatory precept of the ‗great 
chain of being‘ for granted (Knowles, 1962, p. 356); to wit, in 
medieval thought, men ―have enjoyed a special place within the 
cosmic scheme‖ (Jones, 2013, p. 62). The worldview which 
Nicholas of Cusa advanced was quite the opposite. For him, the 
world was the arena where every existence was given 
completely equal status as God. 
Some would argue that such a flattening postulation may, 
on account of its very flatness, dispossess individual beings of 
their individuality by blotting out differences between/among 
them, as some of the less capable pantheistic theorists which 
succeeded to Nicholas contended with rash arguments, 
conferring preference upon generality over peculiarity 
(Erickson, 1998, p. 330; Jaroszyński, 2007, p. 196). But, Nicholas 
went to assiduous pains to differentiate his theory from such a 
totalitarian doctrine (Nicholas of Cusa, 1440/2001, pp. 65-68). 
The concluding remark below would mightily attest his solid 
conviction that although the ontological standing of each object 
must be equal, its individuality should be considered with 
proper deference: 
 
It is evident that God is in all things in such way that all things 
are in Him; and it is now evident that God is in all things 
through the mediation of the universe, as it were. Hence, it is 
evident that all is in all and each in each. (Nicholas of Cusa, 
1440/2001, p. 71) 
 
Here one would identify an unmistakable analogy to 
Harman‘s espousal of flat ontology in his philosophical system 
of OOO. In the universe which Nicholas pictured, all objects are 
not different ontologically; nonetheless, each of them 
simultaneously holds its own position as an independent unit. 
 
*** 
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As Harman has looked on the notion of ‗flat ontology‘ just 
as the base point, Nicholas of Cusa knew well too that he would 
not persuade others who were more or less confined by the 
traditional beliefs to accept such a revolutionary view without a 
well-reasoned logic, and was shrewd enough to grant 
sometimes a certain amount of concession when the 
circumstances required him to do so. Here we should 
remember that he did not deny the transcendental property of 
God. One would estimate the delineation to be a fundamental 
inconsistency; yet, Nicholas of Cusa defined the transcendental 
quality of God in a tactical fashion which reasonably bolstered 
his objective to make his more open-minded outlook 
understandable; to put it differently, in his deductive structure, 
the conception of transcendental God carries out a function 
which ‗withdrawal‘ does in Harman‘s OOO—i.e. it theoretically 
props up the radically liberal stance which looks on all 
existences without discrimination. 
In the early part of On Learned Ignorance, he, like many of 
the intellectuals in his epoch, frankly made clear that God 
should transcend the understanding of all things; yet, he then 
employed an idiosyncratic expression: ―Absolute Maximum‖ 
was the phrase that he used to verbalize the trait, and he 
defined the word in the following manner: ―I give the name 
―Maximum‖ to that than which there cannot be anything 
greater‖ (Nicholas of Cusa, 1440/2001, p. 6). There may seem to 
be little difference between ‗transcendent‘ and ‗maximum‘ as a 
word to modify the Christian God; still, this apparently tiny 
differentiation and the emphasis on the latter were his cunning 
tacks to convince his conservative contemporaries of his point. 
In a preliminary discussion, he put forth the notion of 
―learned ignorance‖, and clarified that it was by no means the 
same with the knowledge of one‘s own ignorance that Socrates 
in Plato‘s dialogues had promoted (Nicholas of Cusa, 
1440/2001, p. 6). He presented it as a religious tenet which a 
follower of Christianity should bear as a subject of the Absolute 
Maximum: ―learned ignorance sees most clearly…that the 
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unqualifiedly Maximum exists necessarily‖ (Nicholas of Cusa, 
1440/2001, p. 12). 
To summarize, Nicholas of Cusa lodged his theory in the 
following fashion: inasmuch as God as the Absolute Maximum, 
in nature, never allows any other being to be comparable with 
it, it is beyond every opposition and contradiction; hence, we 
are on no account able to define God by any affirmative or 
negative statement; as a predictable consequence, nothing in the 
universe can comprehend it, because the understanding of a 
being, limited by the law of contradiction, is not capable of 
uniting the contradictory definitions like X and non-X; 
everyone is thus required to espouse this form of ―learned 
ignorance‖ to be a better Christian (Nicholas of Cusa, 
1440/2001, pp. 16-46). Such a relationship between God as the 
Maximum and ‗learned ignorance‘ was further developed in his 
later works, with Nicholas stating: ―In an infinitely excellent 
way He is prior to whatever is conceived and named by us as 
truth‖ and ―I understand clearly that in the realm of all 
creatures neither God nor His name is found and that God 
escapes all conception‖ (Nicholas of Cusa, 1444/1994, pp. 304-
305). 
These discourses must strike a modern reader as all too 
banal and old-fashioned theological abstractions, and the reader 
would not fathom the reason why Nicholas harped on the same 
string over and over. But, this was the incarnation of diplomatic 
ingenuity of Nicholas. He, cognizant of the indispensability to 
partly conform to the established intellectual paradigm, 
blended his staple argument for the immanence of God with 
the traditional picture of God as transcendent. If God inheres in 
every existence of the world and God as the Absolute 
Maximum, in turn, is never attainable by any other being, it 
would logically follow that nothing can acquire mastery nor 
supremacy over another. Undoubtedly, this kind of reasoning 
was a rhetorical tactic and would not sound sufficiently 
convincing for us modern people; notwithstanding, we ought 
not to ignore the epistemological difference lying between the 
premodern people and us. As Harman sought to propound his 
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object-oriented ontology to other people with the aid of an 
insight of Heidegger, whose ideas have arguably impressed 
modern people most strikingly, Nicholas of Cusa had recourse 
to transcendent God in order to make his case and depicted a 
world where inexhaustible God should inhabit all existences, 
each of which democratically should ‗withdraw‘ from each 
other. 
 
*** 
 
It is natural for one to ponder why such a progressive 
worldview has been basically overlooked for a long time. 
Michel Foucault gave us a beneficial clue to reflect over this 
problem with the famous conception of ‗episteme‘. According 
to him, the primordial pattern which determines people‘s way 
of thinking before the seventeenth century was totally different 
from those which would be accepted thereafter (Foucault, 
1962/2002, pp. 375-422); probably, because of the structural 
disparity, few have been able to regard Nicholas as a thinker 
who advanced an agenda that has an echo with the 
contemporary era. Therefore, he has been counted as just a 
Renaissance theologian. But, at this very moment when the 
esteem for other beings is becoming increasingly important, we 
should look back upon his philosophy, according to which no 
object would be permitted to reign over another as a superior 
because every single one of existences in the world, as God, 
should be given equal status. 
 
Conclusion: Proposals to Philosophy Today and the 
General Public 
 
Above, this paper revealed that object-oriented ontology‘s 
conceptions of flat ontology and withdrawal have unmissable 
similitude with the thoughts of Nicholas of Cusa. In this closing 
section, the author of this paper would like to venture a few 
suggestions for the discipline of philosophy and my fellow 
human beings. Firstly, we ought to reread texts written by 
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philosophers whose ideas are ordinarily deemed as obsolete. 
Words like ‗medieval‘ and ‗transitional‘ may imply that their 
ideas have already been overcome by succeeding generations; 
still, as this article made clear, one could sometimes espy an 
unanticipated insight for this epoch. Although a thorough 
examination will require other papers, the exact logic of 
Thomas Aquinas should be studied in its own right, and the 
cosmology of Giordano Bruno has telling analogies with the 
centrifugal theory of Jacques Derrida. Secondly, it is notable 
that de-anthropocentric opinion was proposed in a quite 
convincing manner as early as the 15th century. The era is far 
ahead of the beginning of the industrial revolution, yet, as 
Hughes (2014) attested, harmful repercussions which activities 
of mankind imposed upon the environment and other 
existences began to expand around that time (p. 104). For those 
who live at this volatile time, it is an imminent task to contain 
the human centrism and to pay due respect to other beings 
which stand on the same plane with us; if we fail to cope with 
this problem, we would be sent to our doom. As long as our 
forefathers including Nicholas of Cusa have afforded beneficial 
monitions, it would be our obligation to hearken their calls and 
to conduct ourselves in a more appropriate manner; the 
resultant world would be, possibly, a republic of objects. 
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